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Abstract—In social robotics, robots needs to be able to be
understood by humans. Especially in collaborative tasks where
they have to share mutual knowledge. For instance, in an
educative scenario, learners share their knowledge and they must
adapt their behaviour in order to make sure they are understood
by others. Learners display behaviours in order to show their
understanding and teachers adapt in order to make sure that
the learners’ knowledge is the required one. This ability requires
a model of their own mental states perceived by others: “has
the human understood that I(robot) need this object for the task
or should I explain it once again ?” In this paper, we discuss
the importance of a cognitive architecture enabling second-order
Mutual Modelling for Human-Robot Interaction in educative
contexts.
I. INTRODUCTION
A social robot is brought to interact with humans. The
quality of this interaction depends on its ability to behave in an
acceptable and understandable manner by the user. Hence the
importance for a robot to take care of his image: how much it
is perceived as an automatic and repetitive agent, or contrarily
as a surprising and intelligent character. If the robot is able
to detect this perception of itself, it can adapt its behaviour in
order to be understood: “you think I am sad while I am happy,
I want you to understand that I am happy”.
In a collaborative context, where knowledge must be shared,
agents must exhibit that they are acquiring the shared infor-
mation with an immediate behaviour: “I look at what you are
showing me, do you see that I am looking at it, do you think I
am paying attention to your explanation ?”; “I have understood
your idea, do you understand that I have understood ?”. As
humans, we have different strategies to exhibit understanding
or to resolve a misunderstanding. As an example, if someone
is talking about a visual object, we alternatively gaze between
the object and the person to make sure he saw that we gazed
at the object. Or if we detect that the other person has not
understood a gesture (e.g. pointing at an object) we would
probably exaggerate the gesture.
Developed by Baron-Cohen and Leslie [1], the Theory of
Mind (ToM) describes the ability to attribute mental states and
knowledge to others. In interaction, humans are permanently
collecting and analysing huge quantity of information to stay
aware of emotions, goals and understandings of their fellows.
In this work, we focus on a generalization of this notion:
Mutual Modelling characterizes the effort of one agent to
model the mental state of another one [2].
Until now, the work conduced by the Human-Robot Inter-
action (HRI) community to develop mutual modelling abilities
in robots was limited to a first level of modelling (see
related work in section II). Higher levels require the ability to
recursively attribute a theory of mind to other agents (I think
that you think that ...) and their application to HRI remains
unexplored. However, a knowledge of oneself perceived by
others is necessary to adapt a behaviour to keep mutual
understanding.
An important challenge of social robotics is to provide as-
sistance in education. The ability of robots to support adaptive
and repetitive tasks can be valuable in a learning interaction.
The CoWriter Project [3], [4] introduces a new approach to
help children with difficulties in learning handwriting. Based
on the learning by teaching paradigm, the goal of the project
is not only to help children with their handwriting, but mainly
to improve their self-confidence and motivation in practising
such exercise.
Learning by teaching engages students to conduct the
activity in the role of the teachers in order to support their
learning process. This paradigm is known to produce motiva-
tional, meta-cognitive and educational benefits in a range of
disciplines [5]. The CoWriter project is the first application of
the learning by teaching approach to handwriting.
The effectiveness of this learning by teaching activity is
built on the “prote´ge´ effect”: the teacher feels responsible
for his student, commits to the student’s success and possibly
experiences student’s failure as his own failure to teach. The
main idea is to promote the child’s extrinsic motivation to write
letters (he does it in order to help his “prote´ge´” robot) and to
reinforce the self-esteem of the child (he plays the teacher and
the robot actually progresses).
In that context, the robot needs to pretend enough difficulties
to motivate the child to help it. This ability of the robot to
pretend strongly depends on the perception of the robot by the
child: the displayed behaviours (gestures, gazes and sounds) by
the robot, the initial level and learning speed of the robot must
match with what the child imagines of a “robot in difficulty”.
In order to adapt to the child, the robot needs then to have a
model of how it is perceived by the child. On the other side,
the child builds also a model of the robot’s difficulties and
attitude. This mutual-modelling is primordial in order to have
mutual understanding and fluid interaction between learner and
teacher.
II. RELATED WORKS
A large amount of fields have introduced frameworks to
describe mutual modelling ability [6]. In developmental psy-
chology Flavell [7] denotes two different levels of perspective
taking: the cognitive connection (I see, I hear, I want, I
like...) and mental representation (what other agents feel, hear,
want...).
From a computational perspective, Epistemic logic describes
knowledges and beliefs shared by agents. This framework
enables consideration of infinite-level of mutual modelling. It
defines a shared-knowledge (all the agents of a group know
X) and a common-knowledge (all the agents of a group know
X, and know that all the agent know X, and know that all the
agents know that all the agents know X, . . . .) [8].
Mutual modelling has also been studied through educational
contexts. Roschelle and Teasley [9] suggested that collabora-
tive learning requires a shared understanding of the task and
of the shared information to solve it. The term “mutual mod-
elling” was introduced in Computer-Supported Collaborative
Learning (CSCL) by Dillenbourg [2]. It focused on knowledge
states of agents. Dillenbourg developed in [10] a computational
framework to represent mutual modelling situations.
However, HRI research has not, until now, explored the
whole potential of mutual modelling. In [11], Scassellati
supported the importance of Leslie’s and Baron-Cohen’s the-
ory of mind to be implemented as an ability for robots.
He focused his work on attention and perceptual processes
(face detection or colour saliency detection). Thereafter, some
works (including Breazeal [12], Trafton [13], Ros [14] and
Lemaignan [15]) were conduced to implement Flavell’s first
level of perspective taking [16] (“I see (you do not see the
book)”), ability that is still limited to visual perception.
Breazeal [17] and Warnier [18] reproduced the Sally and
Anne’s test of Wimmer [19] with robots able to perform visual
perspective taking. The robot was able to infer the knowledge
of a human given the history of his visual experience.
In [20], Lemaignan implemented a system that computes
the visual field of agents and estimates which objects are
looked at in real-time. This time, the robot is not just aware of
what can be seen by agents, but it perceives what is currently
being looked at. Lemaignan used this system to measure
Sharma’s with-me-ness [21], visual commitment based on
expected focus of attention in an activity.
III. MM-BASED REASONING
A first intuition for mutual modelling is to assume that
all agents have the same basic architecture. In [12], Breazeal
show a MM-based reasoning where the robot uses its own
architecture to model other agents. We can imagine a second
level of modelling where the robot recursively attribute to
other agents the mutual modelling ability. But it would create
an infinite recursive loop: the agent then models the robot
that models the agent etc. Another reason to avoid an infinite
recursive approach is that different agents can have different
behaviours: in similar situations, they do not necessarily take
similar decisions.
We propose a different approach of modelling, where we de-
fine two orders of agents: the first-order-agents deal with direct
representations of agents by the robot (for example the child),
while the second-order-agents deal with the representation
of agents by agents (for example the robot-perceived-by-the-
child). Modelling second-order-agent like the robot-perceived-
by-the-child will help to model how the child perceives the
robot, e.g. to make sure the child understands that the robot is
learning from his demonstrations. We can also define nth-
order agents with a higher level of theory of mind. But
taking into account high levels of mutual modelling would
be difficult to process in real time. Unlike the epistemic logic,
our proposed framework will not take into account infinite
regress [22] of mutual modelling.
All sensors (cameras, micros, motor positions etc. and in
the case of CoWriter the tablet’s inputs) are used to perceive
information about the physical behaviour of agents. We call all
the measurable quantities or qualities that provide information
like position in space, the direction of the gaze, speech,
movement and facial expressions etc. as perceived variables.
Each agent’s model is associated with a set of perceived
variables that describes his physical behaviour.
Emotional states of agents cannot be directly measured
directly from sensors. We call abstract variables all the
quantities or qualities that describe the mental state of an
agent. Abstract variables are deduced from the dynamic of
perceived variables. As an example, if the robot points at an
object with its arm, it expects the child to look at the object.
If then the child looks at the hand of the robot, the robot can
deduce that the child has not understood the meaning of its
gesture. The perceived variables are the robot’s gesture and
the gaze direction of the child. The deduced abstract variable
is the understanding of the gesture by the child.
A model of an agent is the set of all the values of the
perceived or abstract variables associated with this model.
Since the values of variables are likely to change with the
time, the models must be dynamic.
In order to deduce the values of abstract variables (that
can’t be obtained from direct perception), we propose to build
a Bayesian model based on the knowledge from perceived
variables. The choice of a probabilist approach instead of a
symbolic approach comes from the errors in the perception
of the robot: knowledge and other mental states of agents
can not be directly perceived through the behaviours. They
must be inferred, hence a probabilistic model enables richer
predictions.
This Bayesian network would contain the probabilities that
abstract variables take values given the values of perceived
variables.
For example, if the robot points at an object and detects
that the child saw the movement, then it expects the child to
look at the targeted object immediately after. In other terms,
if the child looks at the hand of the robot but does not look at
the target object, the probability that the child understood the
pointing movement is expected to be small. Knowing that, the
robot can make the decision to exaggerate its pointing gesture.
IV. DESCRIPTION OF THE ARCHITECTURE
The picture 1 visually summarizes the global design of our
architecture.
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Fig. 1. Overview of the cognitive architecture. Yellow squares
represent the main parts. White ellipses represent modules. It shows
possible devices used for perception and decisions with the context of
the CoWriter Activity. We illustrate the architecture with a situation of
misunderstanding : the child has a bad interpretation of the gesture
of the robot. In order to resolve this misunderstanding, a possible
decision could be to exaggerate the movement.
Our cognitive architecture for mutual modelling contains
three main parts. The perception part (see IV-A) regroups all
the modules that measure the values of the perceived variables
using sensors. These values are sent to the mutual modelling
part (see IV-B) that updates models with measured values of
perceived variables and infers the value of abstract variables in
real-time. Finally, the decision part (see IV-C) contains all the
modules associated to the control of the robot (and other active
devices like tablets in CoWriter). These modules can read
values given by mutual models in order to compute decisions.
In the example of the CoWriter activity, these modules are
given by the system that learns and generate letters, but we
can add a module that generates micro-behaviours, another
that decides to switch to a new activity (e.g. drawing with
the robot),. . . . The following subsections explain in detail the
content and operation of each part of the architecture.
A. Perception modules
The sensitive modules measure values of relevant perceived
variables. While the agent’s gaze direction and facial expres-
sion can be used in any interaction, some additive variables
can be specific to the activity: in CoWriter, a module takes
as input perceived variables from a tablet to compute the
new state of robot’s writing. It defines a sensitive module,
and the value of the new state of the robot to write a letter
defines a perceived variable. The evaluation of the robot by
the child via the feedback buttons on the tablet defines another
perceived variable provided by the modules of the activity.
Other modules are independent of the activity: the system that
estimates the target objects looked at by the child provides
additive information not directly used by the modules of the
activity.
B. Mutual modelling modules
Each perceived value measured by the sensitive modules are
associated with the model of an agent (or a nth-order agent).
Each mutual model can be designed as a module that deals
with a list of associated perceived variables and watch if the
value of one of these variables has been changed. An additive
module knows all the expected causalities and computes the
values of abstract variables. Some expected causalities can be
empirically learned and others pre-programmed.
C. Decision making
The values of mutual modelling variables will provide rich
and useful information for decision making. Taking in account
these values to elaborate decision should improve the realism
and the efficiency of the robot in the interaction. Similarly
to the sensitive ones, the modules that make decisions can
be specific to the activity (in CoWriter, the choice of a
new learning curve or the decision to suddenly make a big
mistake), or can govern a general behaviour (for example the
exaggeration of a misunderstood gesture). Some decisions can
have a high impact on the interaction: to stop an activity
and to switch to a new one can frustrate a child that was
committed. The conditions to make such a decision are not
directly assessable, but must be learned by the robot. In order
to make these decision cautiously, we propose to start by a
Wizard-of-Oz approach and to move towards an autonomous
approach following these steps:
1) Wizard-of-Oz: A human takes decisions; the robot
learns
2) Mixed-initiative: The robot makes suggestions; a hu-
man agrees or disagrees
3) Autonomous: The robot makes decisions
V. CONCLUSION
Educational HRI based on learning by teaching approach
needs robots to be able to perform second-level mutual mod-
elling. We introduced a new approach to implement mutual
modelling into a cognitive architecture. We used the CoWriter
activity as an example of application, but our architecture
could be easily generalised for any kind of interaction. We
believe that this step must be reached in other contexts of
HRI, in order to develop higher realism of behaviours and to
improve the quality of interactions.
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